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*Mr. Bissell approved
with some additions on 18 Sept.*

CHAL-0286

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18 September 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Director
for Planning and Development

SUBJECT: Honolulu Visit

1. In keeping with your instructions which we received through Colonel Burke, Operations DPS/DCL, Security DPS/DCL, and I submit the following actions and proposals for your approval.

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2. A cable attached to Salmer [] OUT 83804) along with his reply [] IN 47005). The sum of this is that the earliest feasible time for the discussions is the latter part of the week of the 22nd.

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3. In elaboration of the proposed schedule of discussions which we speak of in paragraph 5 of our cable [] OUT 83804), we report the following:

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a. Colonel Burke has authorized [] to participate in the discussions on behalf of Operations DPS/DCL.

b. Mr. Lundahl will handle the briefing of the TALENT exhibit. I, along with the Air Force and Navy representatives, will bear the principal burden of providing any needed additional explanations regarding procedures and developments re sanitization, reproduction, communications, and requirements bearing upon the current handling of CHICOM materials. The documentation bearing upon this already exists in approved form either by General Cabell (as in the case of the decision to sanitize) or in implementing actions derived therefrom. Should you wish to inspect these, they will be submitted.

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c. We have outlined in an attached paper the principal approach regarding security and operation support arrangements which, as was pointed out in our discussions, tend to go hand-in-hand and can probably not be entirely separated one from another. However, to clarify our own thinking, these matters are discussed in separate papers.

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4. You will note that the problem of continued stay in Japan is not included on the assumption (gained from your [REDACTED] OUT 83738) that this is a high policy matter. Also, we believe that discussions re repression of reactions [REDACTED] should, if necessary, be discussed by [REDACTED]

5. It is the view of DD/P and Operations DPS/DCI that, as a matter of courtesy and enlisting cooperation of PACOM, Admiral Felt should be briefed. Under present scheduling, this will not be possible in Honolulu. Admiral Felt will not be available at least until 6, 7, or 8 October. He will be in Washington for conferences 30 September - 2 October though ONI doubts he will be available for briefing during that time. It is also believed by DD/P and Ops that such briefing would have a salutary effect of enlisting support of PACOM for continuing operations in Japan in opposition to General Burns' view.

6. You will note that the outline of the activities in this memorandum addresses the problems that we see and how to solve them. In so doing, General Balmer has a role to play which is specified. In so far as General Cabell or other high level officers have given to General Balmer functions bearing upon these questions or related matters at odds with our proposals, we should be advised and counseled perhaps on how best to deal with General Balmer in those regards.

[REDACTED]
JAMES Q. REBER

CIA TALENT Control Officer

Attachments

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CHALICE SECURITY SYSTEM

1. The briefing on this subject would give an overall view of the program including reference to the multiple types of activities involved in the program such as R&D, testing, staging, cover, operations, secure transport of materials to the FI etc. -- all of which are considered to be of direct concern to the security system for protecting the collection apparatus. It would be pointed out that the TALENT system comes into vogue at the point where the photographic or electronic product enters into use and exploitation by consumers.
2. At this point the distinctions between the two systems will be reviewed, copy of paper outlining this point having already been transmitted to all participants through their respective Headquarters.
3. In discussing CHALICE emphasis would be made on the rule, which has been sternly applied, that only those will be cleared for CHALICE who are in fact making a contribution to the project and its success, thus every effort has been made to exclude from clearance those who normally would be presumed to be cleared in any other system for administrative purposes. Within the clearance, furthermore, emphasis has been placed upon making available only that information which is absolutely essential for the participant to do the job assigned to him.
4. CHALICE security standards for clearance would be outlined noting that in each organization where participants reside there exists, either formally designed or otherwise, a CHALICE Security Officer, one of whose principal responsibilities is to assure an adequate justification in submission of requests for clearance and conduct briefing as directed along with the particular responsibility of keeping close watch on security in the handling of all CHALICE matters.
5. To clarify procedure vis-a-vis the Honolulu CINCs on CHALICE clearances, we would propose as follows:
 - a. That the local security officer in each command (to be made known to us while we are there; we would propose that wherever

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possible this also be the JCO) must request with justification the approval of billets for CHALICE clearance. This would be done through their Headquarters Intelligence Service in the case of Army and Navy units; through AFICG-5 in the case of Air Force units.

b. When the billet is approved by the SO/CHALICE, Headquarters of the command in question -- thus, Army, Navy, Air Force -- will testify to the SO/CHALICE as to the clearability of the individual slated for the billet in question, and thereupon will give notice to the CHALICE Security Officer of the theatre command in question to proceed with indoctrination using the security briefing form provided by the CHALICE Security Officer.

c. Military subunits in the Pacific should follow foregoing except that their channel to Washington Headquarters would be through their respective CINCs e.g., 5th Air Force, 7th Fleet, etc.

6. For ready reference and convenience both to the theatre and this Headquarters, CHALICE Security Officer will maintain with [] a complete roster of all CHALICE-cleared personnel both in the theatre commands at Honolulu and the forward areas.

7. CHALICE clearance and related security matters between the commands and their communication Washington Headquarters should be through the TALENT communication channel with a distinctive slug. Such slug will serve to confine information to CHALICE cleared personnel in Headquarters as well as the point of origin.

8. CHALICE matters dealing with operational security, permission information (if approved) etc., should be transmitted via [] to or from Project only over [] channels with alert, if appropriate, through military TALENT communication channel that [] be in touch with message.

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OPERATIONAL SUPPORT FROM PACIFIC THEATRE COMMANDS

1. Principal needs for operational support of Detachment C are for air lift and base support.

Priority Air Lift:

2. Normal staging needs of Base C may require priority air lift to [] and Eileen, Alaska. Normal requirements for such air lift (moving people, film, fuel, spare parts, and spare configurations) can be met by a C-130.

3. In addition, emergency situations, such as the recent one [] may produce requirements for the movement of bulky and heavy objects such as engines, parts of the plane etc. which would require a C-124. In such case the air lift could be both to and from Base C vis-a-vis emergency landing fields within the range of an operation.

Objective re Air Lift:

4. To persuade CINCPAC to authorize PACAF to support requirements listed above whenever the situation presents itself. It is recognized that to implement such authorization the 5th Air Force would have to act. Accordingly, we would seek to establish an understanding at 5th Air Force through PACAF that they will be expected to respond on call on a first priority basis with available assets at that time.

Base Support:

5. At the moment the only known bases where support either is now being given or may be required of concern to this discussion are at []

6. It should be pointed out that at the moment [] has been used only for poststrike, and in this regard base support has aroused no complaint

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from Commander Detachment C, and we should indicate that as far as we are aware, the Project is pleased with the support.

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7. In discussing with them the possibility of prestrike from [] our needs for which we seek their approval in principle (for implementation when required) are on the order of the following:

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- a. Administrative offices.
- b. Billets and messing for 50-75 men, hangar or portion thereof.
- c. Operational rooms.
- d. Ground transport.
- e. Airplane ground handling equipment.

Communications:

8. We would seek their agreement to provide on call communications necessary for operations at the point where one of the foregoing bases were activated for pre- or poststrike purposes. (Such communications were established to meet the poststrike situation [])

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Channel for Delivery of Support
as Agreed Above:

9. We would explain to PACOM and PACAF that our agent for transmitting needs for operational support discussed above would be through [] such request being initiated either by Headquarters or Detachment C. [] would be in a position to answer detailed questions or to get answers necessary for the commands to respond properly.

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10. In addition, 5th Air Force should be alerted for possibility of request for air lift support directly from Commander Detachment C in emergency with information copy to PACAF []

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25X1 11. Finally, Headquarters Operations DP3/DCI will information [] on requests levied by AFCIG-5 against PACAF or 5th Air Force.

12. Normally, we expect most levies to proceed to PACAF from Commander Detachment C []

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URPIC Support:

25X1 13. We would seek assurances from each of the Pacific commands of full and unrestricted support of [] to ensure quality processing of film and timely and accurate reporting of information derived therefrom.

14. Emphasis would be placed on the fact that each of the Services, while having many interests in common, has, in addition, requirements for intelligence information which are peculiar to that Service and which can best be exploited by FIs who are experts in that particular field.

25X1 15. In order to obtain the objectives referred to in paragraph 13, it is essential that each of the Services provide sufficient personnel to adequately man [] their contributions in this regard being in keeping with the requirements which they anticipate levying on the processing center.

25X1 16. In summation, it would be stressed that the overall success of Project operations in tactical situations is directly dependent on the efficiency and thoroughness of [] in processing and interpreting photography obtained and rapid reporting of the results to all interested agencies.

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